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ABSTRACT
Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has emerged as the “come-
back kid” of Japanese politics and in his second term of oﬃce is
now widely regarded as a rare example of strong leadership as he
seeks to arrest and reverse his country’s perceived decline. The
strategy to achieve these objectives has come to be known as the
“Abe Doctrine,” which represents a radical but risky shift in foreign
policy. This article outlines the tenets of the evolving Abe Doctrine
and then applies them to the Abe administration’s behaviour in
the mechanisms of global governance, a highly pertinent but
overlooked example. It argues that although a more strategic
and coherent approach to global governance has emerged
under Abe than had been previously evident, this has been at
the expense of the norm of internationalism that has traditionally
shaped Japan’s role.
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Since December 26, 2012 when he became the ﬁrst post-Occupation politician to return
to the position of prime minister, Abe Shinzo has emerged not only as the “comeback
kid” of Japanese politics but also something of a success story. On May 18, 2013, The
Economist newspaper depicted the body of Superman on its front cover, ﬁst-ﬁrst in
ﬂight as one might expect. What was unexpected was Abe’s photoshopped head set
against the headline “Is it a bird? Is it a plane? No…It’s Japan!” Similar optimism was
evident a couple of months later in a Foreign Aﬀairs interview with Abe entitled “Japan
is Back” that focused on the revival of Japan’s fortunes and Abe’s political leadership
(Abe 2013). In June 2014, a commentary by Noah Smith (2014) entitled “Abe might be
the world’s best leader” was carried in The Japan Times and boldly argued that the
prime minister was “the most eﬀective national leader in the world right now…an
example that the rest of the world should be following.” Before the end of that year, Abe
won a second consecutive landslide election and secured his position. Abe now appears
destined to join the select club of Japanese prime ministers regarded as a “rare strong
leader” (Moritsugu and Yamaguchi 2014).
Such conﬁdent assertions of Japan’s revived fortunes and emphasis on the leadership
role of the Japanese prime minister therein stand in stark contrast to the previously
received wisdom that Japan was in some kind of absolute or relative decline, as well as
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suﬀering from an associated leadership vacuum (Jain and Williams 2011). Breaking
with the previous revolving door of short-lived prime ministers, and particularly in
contrast to the perceived failure and compromised leadership of his short-lived ﬁrst
term in oﬃce (September 2006 to September 2007), the rebooted Abe 2.0 appears to be
a more robust and positively proactive leader. His leadership is seen to have manifested
itself in a number of issue-areas. These include inter alia reviving Japan’s economy
through the “three arrows” of “Abenomics” (monetary easing, ﬁscal stimulus and the
promotion of growth strategies through structural reform); championing historical
revisionism and challenging established post-war interpretations of Japan’s experience
of the Paciﬁc War; and attempting to turn Japan into a more “normal” country in
security terms through a “proactive contribution to peace,” constitutional revision and
reinterpretation of Japan’s self-imposed ban on the right to collective self-defence.
Hughes (2015, 1) has brought together most of these various strands and associated
literatures under what is known as the “Abe Doctrine” and what he regards as a
“dynamic but also high risk” approach to foreign and security policy.
When exploring the questions of whether Japan’s decline has been halted and
reversed, as well as the role of Abe and the adoption of any eponymous doctrine in
such a revival, directing our attention towards the Abe administration’s behaviour in
the mechanisms and institutions of global governance is a worthwhile undertaking for
three reasons.1
First, Japan’s domestic economic and security policies have so far tended to receive
the lion’s share of attention. This is entirely understandable and yet at the same time
presents a narrow focus. Even when attention has been placed on the international
sphere, this has been limited to Japan-US and Japan-East Asia relations. The extant
literature has largely overlooked the Abe administration’s behaviour in the mechanisms
of global governance, especially in response to recent shifts in the global balance of
power and their impact on the global governance architecture (for exceptions see
Dobson 2012a; Rathus 2013).
Second, these recent developments in the global order and architecture of global
governance are both a cause and a symptom of Japan’s perceived decline. Particularly
since the Great Recession of 2008–09, the central mechanisms of global governance,
mostly established by the US in the Cold War period, have come to be regarded as
either irrelevant or in need of dramatic reform; the Groups of 7 (G7) and 8 (G8)
represent an example of the former irrelevance and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) an example of the latter attempted reform. As a member of the pre-crisis world
order centred on the G7/8, Japan’s reaction to these shifts in the global balance of
power was to continue aligning itself with these now seemingly defunct groupings,
tending towards the reactive, reactionary and sometimes contradictory, especially under
the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and compounding perceptions of Japan’s overall
irrelevance (Iwashita 2009; Dobson 2012a). This begs the question of whether, as many
have argued to be the case in other areas of activity, the Abe administration has fostered
a contrasting strategic revival of Japan’s fortunes through the promotion and applica-
tion of a coherent doctrine in the mechanisms of global governance.
Third, several of these mechanisms of global governance, especially the more
informal, ad hoc ones such as the G7, G8, Group of 20 (G20) and World Economic
Forum (WEF), place a much greater emphasis on the role of individual leaders and the
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interpersonal relationships that they construct between and amongst each other. In this
context, the mechanisms of global governance provide both a clear opportunity by
which an individual leader can assert him/herself, especially at a time of reform and
reordering, as well as an area of activity that allows us to gauge the contribution of an
individual leader, in this case Abe and the impact of an eponymous doctrine aimed at
addressing Japan’s decline.
With the objectives of interrogating the narrative of Japan’s (and by association
Abe’s) recent “revival” through the architecture of global governance, and exploring
whether an Abe Doctrine has emerged and what its impact has been, this article is
structured as follows. It begins by discussing Japan’s perceived decline before Abe’s
return to power in December 2012, explores his leadership role and resulting signs of
Japan’s apparent revival across a range of issue areas, then outlines the tenets of the Abe
Doctrine. It then shifts focus to the recent global redistribution of power and its impact
on the architecture and mechanisms of global governance before outlining the speciﬁc
challenges for Japan and its previous responses to this changing global order. After
setting the scene prior to Abe’s return to power, the bulk of the article then reviews Abe
and his administration’s participation in a number of summits and meetings of the
institutions and mechanisms of global governance from 2013 to the end of 2015
through the lens of the Abe Doctrine. This review is focused on but not conﬁned to
the G7, G8, G20, the Tokyo International Conference on Aid and Development
(TICAD), the United Nations (UN) system, and WEF. It is based on interviews with
leading Japanese policymakers, Japan watchers and observers of global summitry (often
at the media centres of some of the summits in question), as well as media reportage,
summit declarations and press conferences in both English and Japanese. The article
argues that under Abe the application of the Abe Doctrine is certainly in evidence and
has resulted in a more coherent and strategic approach to global governance than that
seen in recent years and under various administrations. However, although this may
constitute a strategic revival in Japan’s multilateral foreign policy, it is narrowly focused,
falls some distance short of Japan’s more traditional and successful leadership role in
the mechanisms of global governance informed by the norm of internationalism, and is
likely to fail.
A Tale of Two Abes and an Evolving Abe Doctrine
The topic of Japan’s decline – absolute or relative – is a well-worn topic in the popular
and scholarly imagination. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan is seen to have suﬀered
at least one (unfortunate) and possibly two (careless) “lost decades” as a result of
economic stagnation, political inertia and social malaise at home, and at the same
time has struggled to ﬁnd a role in the world. For some, this decline was compounded
by a sense of frustration at the opportunities that were lost at the end of the Cold War
as captured by Michael Green (2003, 239): “[w]hat a decade [the 1990s] might have
been…Japan might have emerged as a new kind of superpower.” Despite the proactive
blip of the Koizumi administration, Japan’s decline was seen to continue throughout the
ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century only to gather pace in the second decade with the
rise of China. The nature and reality of this decline has been traced across a range of
issues and areas of activity (Jain and Williams 2011).
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However, for many, this narrative of decline was too simplistic and actually
masked signs of Japan’s possible and actual revival (see Dobson 2005; Pilling
2014). Especially since December 2012 and the return to power of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP), attention has once again been paid to Japan’s re-
emergence. This has been closely tied to Abe, whose previous term in oﬃce was
regarded, even by Abe (2013) himself, as a failure. He resigned citing health reasons,
seemingly written oﬀ as another short-lived prime minister symptomatic of Japan’s
ongoing decline. In contrast, six years and several prime ministers later, Abe
returned, apparently rejuvenated and hoping that history does not repeat itself ﬁrst
as tragedy and second as farce.
Some observers believe that Abe has returned as a diﬀerent leader and that this is not
a simple continuation of his previously failed agenda (Smith 2014; Moritsugu and
Yamaguchi 2014). Whilst acknowledging certain continuities that persist, particularly
in Abe’s worldview, there are clear diﬀerences that demonstrate learning on the part of
Abe as an individual and the LDP as a political party. One example is that although Abe
and the LDP may have technically won the Lower House Election of December 16, 2012
(in fact, its greatest electoral victory in its history), it was widely acknowledged that it
did not win the hearts and minds of the electorate and there was hardly the jubilation
seen in previous landslide victories. In fact, the number of people voting for the LDP in
2012 was lower than in 2009 when the DPJ recorded its own historic landslide victory.
Rather, the Japanese electorate sought to express its dissatisfaction with three years of
DPJ rule or did not bother to turn out at all. Abe appeared to be well aware of this and
to have learned from the misplaced emphasis of his ﬁrst and failed administration on
nationalism at the expense of the economy and welfare. In his “Japan is Back” interview
in Foreign Aﬀairs, Abe (2013) explained his ﬁrst administration’s failure through his
inability to prioritise and desire to do everything at once. Thereafter, he claims to have
conducted a “listening exercise,” utilising social rather than traditional media, and as a
result chose to focus on the economic revival of Japan. The fact that he placed the
emphasis on Abenomics, consisting of monetary easing to target inﬂation, ﬁscal stimu-
lus including a ¥10 trillion package and the promotion of growth strategies through
structural reform, presents a stark example of learning and a pragmatic priority rather
than pursuing an ideological foreign policy.
In terms of concrete results, the initial narrative was one of “so far, so good” and Abe
was able to claim a series of quick wins (see Kantei 2013a; Amari 2013). The LDP
rapidly appointed its preferred candidates to the Governorship and Deputy
Governorship of the Bank of Japan and signs of economic recovery soon emerged:
the value of the yen fell from ¥83 to the dollar in December 2012 to ¥100 to the dollar
six months later, the Nikkei stock market index exceeded 15,000 in mid-May 2013, the
ﬁrst time in ﬁve years, representing a rise of almost 60% from ¥9,895 over the same
period since Abe came to power. Japan began to return stronger growth ﬁgures.
Opinion polls proved to be relatively resilient, demonstrating high approval ratings of
at least 60% six months after the LDP’s return to power. Upper House electoral victory
in summer 2013 and a second landslide victory in the Lower House election of
December 2014 conﬁrmed Abe’s position until 2018 and resolved to an extent the
legislative logjam of a divided Diet. Although more sobering economic results followed
and opinion polls reﬂected this, Abe was able in the short term to burnish Japan’s
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international standing in terms of economic recovery and the role of his political
leadership.
However, in some quarters the reaction to Abe’s immediate return was to warn that
he would seek to pursue the nationalist agenda of his previous short-lived administra-
tion. Hosaka (2013) argued that “[t]he ﬁrst Abe administration, including the cabinet,
largely resembles the present one, and accordingly, the ﬁrst Abe administration pro-
vides important clues for how the second one will develop.” Pekkanen (2013) acknowl-
edged change in that the LDP learned how to be an eﬀective opposition party in
holding the DPJ to account whilst not obstructing its policies simply for the sake of
it, but agreed with the sense of continuity and argued that the LDP had not changed
radically in terms of party organisation nor Abe in terms of vision whilst in opposition.
This increasingly appeared to be the case as Abe returned in time to aspects of his
policy platform that echoed the same nationalistic, hawkish foreign policy that was
developed in his 2006 book Utsukushii Kuni he (Towards a Beautiful Country). In this
book, and over time, Abe has discussed his objective of making Japan a truly sovereign
nation in line with its great power status. To this end, he has outlined a more proactive
role for Japan in the world by which it would pursue “values-oriented” diplomacy that
stresses democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law and the market economy,
fulﬁll its responsibilities under the US-Japan Security Treaty, undertake an expanded
security role supported by increased military spending, and adopt a robust position in
relation to China by, for example, refusing to acknowledge any issue of sovereignty over
the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. This has inevitably led him to highlight a number
of unsettled post-war accounts and his desire to break free of constraints on Japan’s
security role by revising the constitution and exercising the right of collective self-
defence. At the same time, Abe has outlined a historical revisionist agenda that
questions the victor’s justice metered out by the Tokyo Tribunal that established the
post-war narrative of Japan as the aggressor, sanctions the veneration of Japan’s war
dead at Yasukuni Shrine, and confronts the issue of the coercion of sexual slaves
euphemistically called “comfort women” in the Japanese Imperial Armed Forces. All
of these aspects have emerged in a number of Abe’s statements and speeches since
December 2012 (Abe 2013; Kantei 2013a, 2013b; MOFA 2013a, 2013b, 2014a; Kantei
2015a, 2015b). Although never oﬃcially referred to explicitly as such, taken collectively,
these various elements have been dubbed an evolving Abe Doctrine by Japanese and
non-Japanese commentators alike (for the former, see Chuo Koron February 2013;
Yachi 2013; Fukuda 2015; Mori 2015; for the latter, see Hughes 2015; Singh 2014).
This evolving doctrine can be summarised in four tenets. The starting point is Abe’s
desire to arrest Japan’s decline, whether it be real or perceived, and assert its credentials
as a contemporary great power. Whether related to Japan’s security posture, economic
status or view of history, the other tenets of the doctrine are essentially the means to
this overarching end (Hughes 2015, 9–12). Abe’s desire to staunch Japan’s perceived
decline and assert its great power status was neatly encapsulated in his 2015 New Year
address:
Our predecessors accomplished rapid economic growth, making Japan one of the greatest
powers in the world. There is no reason whatsoever that the Japanese of that era could
achieve this but the Japanese of today cannot. Now, as we mark the new year, I have
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renewed my determination to, together with the Japanese people, make Japan a country
that once again shines on the world’s center stage (cited in Kantei 2015a).
In foreign policy, Abe has pursued this goal by adopting the approach of “values-
oriented diplomacy” that characterised his short-lived ﬁrst period in power and was by
and large pursued by subsequent LDP and DPJ prime ministers (Dobson 2012a).
“Values-oriented diplomacy” originates in a speech given by Aso Taro, then Foreign
Minister under Abe, on November 30, 2006. In this speech, given to the Japan Institute
of International Aﬀairs and entitled “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding
Diplomatic Horizons,” Aso deﬁned this approach as “…placing emphasis on the
‘universal values’ such as democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and the
market economy as we advance our diplomatic endeavors” (MOFA 2006). Aso also
deﬁned the geographical remit of this “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” and Japan’s role
therein. To this end, he stressed his belief that within:
this sweeping arc stretching from Northeast Asia to Central Asia and the Caucasus,
Turkey, Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, Japan will serve as an “escort
runner” to support these countries that have just started into this truly never-ending
marathon…
Japan must make its ties even ﬁrmer with friendly nations that share the common views
and interests, namely of course the United States as well as Australia, India, and the
member states of the EU and NATO, and at the same time work with these friends
towards the expansion of this “arc of freedom and prosperity (MOFA 2006).
Both in terms of the articulated values and the geographical remit, the unspoken
concern at the heart of this approach is managing China’s rise through exclusion and
isolation (Laurence 2007; Taniguchi 2010).
Second, and building on this, the Abe Doctrine stresses that Japan’s great power
status can be restored by addressing a number of perceived “shackles” that have
hampered Japan’s eﬀorts to play a proactive role in the world. To this end, the Abe
administration has targeted revision of Japan’s post-war constitution, and particu-
larly the peace clause of Article 9, alongside other manifestations of Japan’s minimal
role in defence and security aﬀairs such as the self-imposed ban on military exports
as a key objective. It is argued that this will signify a break with the post-war regime
of minimal contributions and a low proﬁle in terms of security, and facilitate a
“proactive contribution to peace” (Singh 2014, 2; Hughes 2015, 12–14). At the same
time, this objective extends to other aspects of the constitution that are unrelated to
its security posture but are regarded as “un-Japanese,” such as the “Western”
emphasis on rights over responsibilities. To this end, the Abe administration has
pursued contrasting approaches. For example, in April 2012 before its return to
power, the LDP approved a draft constitution that inter alia rewrote Article 9 to
recognise a National Defence Force and contested the basic concept of universal
human rights by stressing Japan’s historical and cultural context and prioritising
“public interest” and “public order” over “fundamental human rights” (Yomiuri
Shinbun, April 28, 2012). Soon after being elected in December 2012, Abe sought
to pursue constitutional revision through revision of Article 96, which outlines the
conditions that need to be met when attempting to revise the constitution. However,
these attempts were met with popular opposition and soon abandoned. Then, in
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July 2014, a cabinet decision was announced to exercise Japan’s right to collective
self-defence, thereby setting the scene for a tense legislative process during Summer
2015 from which Abe emerged successful.
Third, this desire to overturn the post-war obstacles that constrain Japan’s proactive
and independent behaviour in foreign and security policy extends beyond concrete
manifestations like the constitution to include historical interpretations of the Paciﬁc
War that have dominated the post-war period (Hughes 2015, 15–23; Kantei 2013b,
2015b). These range from challenging the post-war narrative of Japan as the aggressor
established in the Tokyo Tribunal, to venerating Japan’s war dead at Yasukuni Shrine,
and questioning the Japanese Imperial Armed Forces’ actual use of “comfort women”
and the 1993 Kono Statement by which the Japanese government recognised the role of
coercion therein.
Finally, and although not explicitly identiﬁed as a tenet in Hughes’s discussion of the
Abe Doctrine, the objectives of securing Japan’s great power status and promoting a
more proactive and robust Japanese security role by challenging post-war taboos and
constraints can only be achieved through an economically strong Japan. The popular
narrative is often a tale of two Abes in terms of Abe the pragmatic, economic animal
who learned lessons from his ﬁrst failed administration and was then heralded for his
promotion of Abenomics, in contrast to Abe the nationalistic idealist who has recently
re-emerged seeking to make Japan “normal,” reverse its decline, and respond robustly
to China supported by constitutional revision and historical revisionism. However,
attempting to separate Abenomics from Abe’s nationalist agenda represents something
of a false dichotomy and, rather like Schrödinger’s cat, Abe the pragmatist and Abe the
nationalist exist together at the same time and are mutually reinforcing. In Abe’s
worldview, Japan cannot provide a strong regional and global presence unless it
emerges from its long-running economic malaise. As The Economist argued in its
May 18, 2013 edition, Abenomics is as much about regional security, Japan’s status in
the world and the Meiji-period slogan of fukoku kyohei (rich country, strong army) as it
is about economic growth. Thus, Abenomics should be added to the restoration of
Japan’s great power status, ending the post-war regime and historical revisionism as the
central tenets of the Abe Doctrine.
All this contrasts with the dominant Cold War “Yoshida Doctrine” of prioritising
economic growth and engagement with regional neighbours whilst pursuing a low-
proﬁle foreign policy and restrained defence policies under the wing of a US security
guarantee. Since electoral victories in 2013 and 2014, it appears that Abe is beginning to
pursue this doctrine more overtly both in Japan’s national security policy and across a
range of key bilateral and regional relationships.
The Shifting Global Order and the Challenge for Japan
Having explored both Abe’s leadership credentials in arresting Japan’s decline and the
basic tenets of the Abe Doctrine, and before turning to the recent application of this
doctrine in the mechanisms of global governance, this section provides further context
by outlining how we have understood Japan’s traditional role in these mechanisms, its
response to recent shifts in the global order as reﬂected in the architecture of global
governance and the extent to which leaders are able to exercise agency therein.
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Japan’s traditional role in the mechanisms of global governance has to a considerable
extent been shaped by the norm of internationalism, or, in other words, “…the
expression of cooperation with and support for the ideals of international society…”
(Hook et al. 2012, 66). Inoguchi (2014a, 944) regards liberal internationalism, deﬁned as
“working through and enhancing global norms and institutions, strengthening Japan’s
ability to enhance itself and work with other states under conditions of deep globaliza-
tion,” as one of the core traditions of its foreign policy. Others have described its role as
that of an internationalist-minded, middle power exhibiting “quiet” leadership (Soeya
2005, 2012). In concrete terms, the story that emerges is that global governance and its
mechanisms have mattered to Japan.
Take, for example, the UN. Japan was a latecomer in 1956 to this central mechanism
of global governance. However, it has occupied a special place in Japan’s foreign policy
both normatively and concretely. Although compromised by Cold War pressures, Japan
advocated publicly “UN-centred diplomacy” and “UN-centrism” as one of the three
pillars of its foreign policy (alongside cooperation with other major democracies and
maintaining a position as a member of Asia). Since then, and considering its position as
a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Japan has
made substantial and prompt contributions to the UN’s regular and peacekeeping
budgets. It has sought out and served in the role of non-permanent member of the
UNSC a record number of times, has responded to calls to reform the UN with concrete
proposals, worked to increase its levels of personnel working within the UN, and slowly
but steadily contributed more actively to the UN’s peacekeeping functions.
The G7/8 provides another illustrative example of how the norm of internationalism
has manifested itself (Dobson 2004, 176–182). Historically excluded from, or still
constrained within, the oﬃcial and legal mechanisms of global governance, inclusion
in the ﬁrst of these informal summits of contemporary great powers accorded status
and recognition to Japan. In response, Japan sought to demonstrate its credentials as a
responsible great power and ensure the success of the process, especially on the ﬁve
occasions it has hosted the G7/8 summit (1979, 1986, 1993, 2000 and 2008). This can be
seen in concrete outcomes like the Japanese-led initiative to place the ﬁght against
infectious diseases on the agenda of the 2000 G8 Summit that resulted in the establish-
ment of the Global Health Fund and the saving of seven million lives; or, on the other
hand, in the ﬁrst ever attempt to accommodate civil society groups in the summit
process. In addition to its eﬀorts to host consistently successful summits, this normative
impulse can also be seen in Japan’s high levels of compliance with summit pledges (see
G8 Research Group 2015).
Japan’s relationship with the IMF represents a ﬁnal concrete example of the inﬂuence
of the internationalist norm. Japan’s role has developed from one of initial passivity
after it joined in 1952 to proactivity by which it has sought to communicate its own
experience and vision of economic development (Holroyd and Momani 2012, 205). A
recent example of Japan’s continued adherence to the norm of internationalism can be
seen during the Great Recession. It was Japan that bailed out the IMF rather than the
IMF coming to the aid of East Asia, most notably demonstrated by the Japanese
government’s US$100 billion loan to the IMF towards the end of 2008 without any
accompanying claims for an increase in quotas and inﬂuence. Hard-nosed Realist
motivations have been highlighted by Grimes (2009) and Holroyd and Momani
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(2012) to explain this “unprecedentedly large loan,” including the absence of risk
involved because of the low costs associated with making the loan, the “laundering of
state preferences” so that Japan could delegate to the IMF with impunity the task of
attaching contentious political conditions to any loans, and Japan’s desire to reinforce
the IMF, the old world order and its position therein. However, the most notable
explanatory variable was responding to the norm of internationalism and its responsi-
bilities as a great power, especially in the absence of contributions from the US, Europe
or China. As one MOF oﬃcial is quoted as saying “Japan can’t be selﬁsh and short-
sighted” and it was not felt to be appropriate or immediately helpful to anybody to tie a
loan of this magnitude and in these circumstances to a review of quotas to Japan’s
beneﬁt (Holroyd and Momani 2012, 209).
However, the shifting global order has impacted on the mechanisms of global
governance in a number of ways. For example, the shift from the G7/8 of industrialised
democracies to the G20, including many developing countries, as the “premium forum
for international economic cooperation”; the subsequent 2010 agreement to reform the
IMF’s quotas and governance structures to accommodate a number of rising powers,
particularly China; and ﬁnally China’s announcement in October 2013 of the creation
of an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS countries’ agreement
in July 2014 to establish a New Development Bank. Japan’s reactions to these develop-
ments, particularly in the case of GX summitry, have been explored elsewhere (see
Dobson 2012a; Rathus 2013). Suﬃce to say that these shifting sands of global govern-
ance have presented a considerable challenge to Japan.
The Japanese government initially sought to respond to the global shift of power and
reform of global governance institutions by continuing to respond to this internation-
alist normative impulse that has shaped its behaviour previously. This can be seen in
making substantial ﬁnancial contributions to the intensive period of G8 and G20
summitry during this time, particularly the largest loan in history at the 2008 G20
Washington Summit as mentioned above. However, Japan experienced setbacks – most
clearly demonstrated in its inability to secure the role of G20 chair and in fact losing out
to regional rivals South Korea in 2010 and China in 2016. It has felt its identity-deﬁning
position as Asia’s representative in the mechanisms of global governance under threat
as the G20 now includes China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, and even Australia as
Asian members. In reaction, successive Japanese prime ministers and policymakers
have reverted to more competitive Realist behaviour by openly questioning China and
South Korea’s levels of commitment to the pledges made at G20 summits, and thus,
their sense of responsibility to the international community and ability to behave as
contemporary great powers. Japanese leaders and policymakers have also praised the
role of the G20 and want to see it succeed but not at the expense of the G8 and have at
the same time repeatedly stressed the fact that the G8 continues to be important, citing
the like-mindedness of its leaders as the justifying factor for its continued existence
based on their shared belief in “open, democratic society, dedicated to individual liberty
and social advancement” as stated in the original Declaration of the ﬁrst Rambouillet
Summit of the G7. Thus, any initial enthusiasm for the G20 has waned and the result is
that Japan’s behaviour has appeared qualiﬁed, contradictory and reactionary.
This smorgasbord of responses to the rise of the G20, the decline of the G8 and the
changing global order more broadly corresponds with a turbulent time in Japan’s domestic
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politics (Ina 2012). Since Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro stepped down in
September 2006 having won a landslide election the previous year, two further landslide
elections have taken place, removing unequivocally the LDP from power in 2009 and
giving the DPJ its chance, before then returning the LDP to power rather more equivocally
in 2012 and 2014 but with landslide victories nonetheless. Both alongside and as part of
this turbulence we have witnessed a revolving door of Japanese prime ministers each failing
to stay in power for more than a year on average and hardly long enough to realise their
visions. From when Koizumi stepped down to Abe’s ﬁrst landslide victory in
December 2012, six annual G8 summits were attended by six diﬀerent prime ministers.
In the case of the seven G20 summits held during this time, four Japanese prime ministers
attended, in comparison to one German chancellor and two US presidents. Clearly Japan
has not displayed the same levels of consistency in representation that other countries
enjoy. This is unfortunate for Japan because, as mentioned above, individual leaders are
crucial to the functioning of the more informal mechanisms of global governance. For
example, since its inception, G7/8 summitry has been founded on the potential of political
leadership and the personal encounter within a community of like-minded leaders. To this
end, bureaucratic input was minimised, formal agendas discarded and the informal atmo-
sphere emphasised (Bayne 2005). Obviously the reality today involves a considerable
amount of bureaucracy and preparation; however, the central role is still played by the
president, prime minister or chancellor and examples of how they have shaped agendas –
successfully or unsuccessfully – can be seen in Tony Blair’s promotion of African issues at
the 2005 Gleneagles Summit, the collective response and abandonment of beggar-thy-
neighbour policies orchestrated by Gordon Brown at the 2009 G20 London Summit, or
Angela Merkel’s reiterative emphasis on climate change at the G7/8 summits she hosted in
2007 and 2015. However, as mentioned at the outset of this article, the instability in
Japanese politics appears to be over; Japan and Abe are now back for the foreseeable future.
So, in summary, if we wish to explore the impact of Abe’s eponymous foreign policy
doctrine that aims to arrest the decline of Japan, then it should not be forgotten that
this decline is starkly evident in the global shift of power and the architecture of global
governance where Japan’s traditional internationalist approach has faltered and the
opportunities for an individual leader to have an impact are ampliﬁed. In short, global
governance is an area of activity worth exploring.
Pursuing the Abe Doctrine in Global Governance
Turning now to the series of global summits and meetings that form the architecture of
global governance from January 2013 just after Abe returned to power through to
November 2015 in the aftermath of the G20 Summit in Antalya, Turkey, the following
questions are addressed. To what extent, and in what ways, has the Abe Doctrine been
promoted? How has this impacted upon Japan’s role in global governance? They will be
answered by exploring each of the tenets of the doctrine outlined above in turn before
the conclusion then evaluates whether, as a result, Abe has addressed Japan’s recent
confused responses to the shifting global order and what the implications are for
Japan’s traditional internationalist approach to global governance.
208 H. DOBSON
Restoring Japan’s great power status
As mentioned above, the central goal of the Abe Doctrine is to arrest Japan’s decline
and maintain its great power status particularly by responding robustly to the rise of
China. However, there have been some attempts to manage the relationship with China
and regional neighbours in a more constructive manner through the opportunities
aﬀorded by the regular series of global governance meetings and summits throughout
the year. For example, at the 2013 G20 St Petersburg Summit, exchanges of courtesies
with Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye took place and in his post-summit press conference,
Abe stressed a “mutually beneﬁcial relationship based on common strategic interests.”
In January 2014 at the WEF meeting in Davos, Abe attended Park’s speech and
conferred brieﬂy with South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se (Inoguchi 2014b,
105). Later that year in the lead up to the Asia Paciﬁc Economic Co-operation forum
meeting in Beijing from 10 to 11 November 2014, much speculation focused on possible
steps towards reconciliation through a bilateral meeting between Abe and Xi. This
meeting did indeed take place and, although both leaders appeared ill at ease with each
other, resulted in some ﬁrst steps towards crisis management mechanisms being put in
place.
Nevertheless, the dominant approach adopted within the mechanisms of global
governance has been to reiterate and embed the values of democracy, freedom,
human rights, the rule of law and the market economy at regular opportunities. Not
only do they constitute and resonate with “values-oriented diplomacy,” they also serve
as the ideological glue that binds an informal elite group with no oﬃcial membership
criteria like the G7/8 together. This, in turn, reinforces Japan’s position within this
select group and its great power status. In contrast, the logic follows that a more diverse
forum like the G20, which includes regional rivals like China and Korea, struggles to
identify values that bind it together and legitimise its role.
So, across his attendance at global governance summits and meetings, Abe’s eﬀorts
to reiterate and embed these universal values are clearly in evidence. For example, at the
G20 summit in Brisbane from 15 to 16 November 2014 Abe’s feverishly active diplo-
macy continued unabated as he hosted a dinner with Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi on the eve of the summit and also held a three-way discussion with Obama and
Abbott on the sidelines of the ﬁrst day of the summit. Both meetings can be interpreted
as part of Abe’s eﬀorts to reinforce key regional allies in an eﬀort to balance against
China. In the case of the latter meeting, the three leaders declared in a thinly veiled
reference to China that:
this partnership rests on the unshakable foundation of shared interests and values,
including a commitment to democracy and open economies, the rule of law, and the
peaceful resolution of disputes…The three leaders also underscored …ensuring freedom of
navigation and over-ﬂight and the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes in accordance
with international law, including through legal mechanisms such as arbitration (White
House 2014).
At the 2015 G7 Summit at Schloss Elmau, in his post-summit press conference, Abe
echoed the leaders’ declaration and stressed numerous times how it was the shared
values of freedom, democracy, basic human rights and the rule of law that bind the G7
leaders together and give it its deﬁning character as a forum (Kantei 2015c). Not only
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was this an assertion of the values at the heart of his signature diplomatic approach and
an attempt to reinforce the G7 as a great-power grouping, it also allowed him to
reinforce the comparison between Russia and China as both ﬂouting these values in
the case of Ukraine and the South China Sea respectively and bring the world’s
attention to the latter.
One other key aspect of Japan’s great power status has been its self-appointed role as
a representative of Asia, particularly within the mechanisms of global governance. For
example, immediately after the end of the Cold War, Japan went out and batted for
itself and Asia in global ﬁnancial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF
(Rapkin, Elston, and Strand 1997). Building on these previous eﬀorts, Japan’s recent
position on the restructuring of IMF voting rights promoted through the G20 has been
described as positive (Rathus 2013, 229). However, as regards the other reforms of the
IMF championed by the G20, the Abe administration’s behaviour has recently under-
mined its rhetoric, as can be seen in relation to the agreed introduction of competition
in the appointment of the heads of international institutions. Abe has been ready to
promote Japan’s great power status more forcefully in Realist terms, for example
reinforcing its historic control of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) by installing
Nakao Takehiko, another Japanese citizen, as its president to replace Kuroda Haruhiko
who was moved to the Bank of Japan and thereby ignoring promises made at the 2009
G20 London Summit and reiterated at the 2010 G20 Pittsburgh Summit that the head
of any international institution would be chosen through an “open, transparent and
merit-based process” (see G20 Research Group 2016).2
One interpretation of the Abe administration’s and the ADB’s behaviour has pointed
to fear of Chinese domination as a possible motivating factor, although the evidence for
this claim is lacking and the ADB was, at least up until the Great Recession, a forum in
which a relatively harmonious Sino-Japanese relationship evolved (Rathus 2008).
However, this changed in October 2013 when China announced its creation of the
AIIB. For some the new bank is to be welcomed, according to Elek (2014):
[t]here is room for a new development bank, specialised in ﬁnancing large-scale economic
infrastructure on commercial terms, working alongside existing multilateral development
banks…The World Bank and the ADB are now focusing on concessional lending and
knowledge sharing with low-income countries, leaving an important niche to be ﬁlled by a
new ﬁnancial institution…The AIIB will create new competition for the World Bank and
ADB, but the new bank will also have a strong incentive to cooperate with them.
The Abe administration’s response has been to dismiss the AIIB, downplay its cap-
abilities and question its transparency and governance structure in an attempt to
protect the inﬂuence of the ADB and burnish Japan’s status. Despite possible divisions
on the issue of the AIIB, Abe took the opportunity of the Schloss Elmau Summit to
continue communicating these concerns to his fellow summiteers. In contrast, some
have urged the Abe administration to sign up to the AIIB and seek to inﬂuence it from
within (Kikuchi and Masutomo 2015), an argument that appears to resonate with fellow
great power summiteers France, Germany, Italy and the UK, who all ignored Japan’s
warnings and applied to become founding members in March 2015.
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Ending the post-war regime
Eﬀorts at home to carve out a new security role for Japan that breaks the “shackles” of
minimal contributions have been replicated in the Abe administration’s behaviour in
the mechanisms of global governance. For example, as mentioned below, Abe took the
opportunity when addressing the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) on September 26, 2013 to promote Abenomics, a central pillar of the Abe
Doctrine. However, woven into this promotion of Abenomics was the other side of the
doctrine that stresses ending the post-war regime. This was manifested in his promo-
tion of Japan’s “proactive contribution to peace,” promising that Japan can be “even
more actively engaged in UN collective security measures, including peacekeeping
operations,” whilst still acknowledging Japan’s adherence to the concept of “human
security” (Kantei 2013c). Japan has traditionally upheld “human security” as an example
of its intellectual leadership (see Kurusu and Kersten 2011). As Honna (2012) has
explained in detail, this has extended to opposition to the new norm of Responsibility to
Protect (R2P) despite the UN’s eﬀorts to act as a norm entrepreneur in promoting its
adoption. This is not predominantly, as might be expected, a result of fears that R2P
justiﬁes unilateral intervention. It is also driven by an ideological turf war in which
Japan wishes to preserve human security as its preferred and long-vaunted ideational
contribution and avoid association with R2P. However, Abe appears to be supplanting
this traditional approach and prioritising Japan’s ability to make a “proactive contribu-
tion to peace,” which ultimately includes addressing a number of post-war constraints.
In the same speech Abe also promoted other security issues, stressing the strategic
nature and success of June’s TICAD-V by emphasising Japan’s position as “an enduring
partner weaving dreams side by side with Africa.” Open criticism of North Korea, its
nuclear programme and inevitably the abduction issue were clearly articulated, whilst
veiled criticism of China was seen in his emphasis of the fact that Japan’s “national
interests are ﬁrmly connected to the stability of seas that are open, [and] changes to the
maritime order through the use of force or coercion cannot be condoned under any
circumstances” (Kantei 2013c).
At the WEF meeting in January 2014, Abe once again took the opportunity to
promote Japan’s “proactive contribution to peace” by highlighting the Self-Defence
Forces’ contributions to relief eﬀorts in the Philippines and combatting piracy in
Djibouti (Kantei 2014). Abe deployed the metaphor “a new Japan is now waving a
banner for proactive contribution to peace” that for some stands in contrast to Japan’s
previously minimalist role, or is redolent to others of the militaristic ﬂag of the rising
sun. He also shifted the focus to the threat of territorial disputes in the East Asian
region and possible military escalation, calling for respect for the rule of law, promotion
of the international law of the sea, and transparency in military budgets in a thinly
veiled attack on China.
Although the G8 Lough Erne Summit’s agenda was ﬁrmly placed on economic
issues, Abe succeeded in having security issues discussed, particularly North Korea.
In line with his predecessors, Abe succeeded in including reference in the ﬁnal
communiqué of human rights issues and speciﬁcally the abductions of Japanese
citizens by North Korean agents – something he was able to achieve at the 2014
Brussels Summit and 2015 Schloss Elmau Summit of the G7 and can be regarded as
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a given considering Japan’s track record in pursuing this issue with its G7/8 partners
since 2003 and especially in light of Abe’s personal interest in the issue and
participation in the ﬁrst high-level Japan-North Korea summit in 2002 (Kantei
2015c).
However, Abe has diﬀered from his immediate predecessors in targeting the G7/8
summits to pursue speciﬁc policies that challenge the post-war regime. From the
beginning of 2013, the G8 Summit was set as the target for the creation of a compre-
hensive agreement promoting UK-Japan intelligence sharing and the joint development
of defence equipment. The agreement endorsed at Lough Erne allows Japan to provide
the UK with defence technology despite the fears of some that this contradicts the
principles that have historically banned the export of weapons and related technology.
The agreement with the UK suggests Abe’s willingness to see Japan’s role enhanced in
the ﬁeld of security without being overly constrained by what some perceive as post-war
taboos. Moreover, it demonstrates his willingness to use the mechanisms of global
governance to achieve these goals. As Japan was bidding (ultimately unsuccessfully) to
provide Australia with its next generation of submarines, Abe’s discussion of shared
security concerns in the South China Sea with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm
Turnbull at the G20 Antalya Summit in November 2015 can be seen to represent a
similar development.
Continuing to shift the attention from general approaches to more speciﬁc issues like
weapons exports, Japan’s Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) policy emerges as
another global governance issue that has been reinterpreted in line with the Abe
Doctrine. The Abe administration has promoted a review of traditional guidelines to
include a more explicitly strategic dimension that serves Japan’s national interest and
security whilst downplaying the more normative and internationalist dimensions of
ODA introduced over recent decades such as the ban on the use of aid for military
purposes and its role in the promotion of democracy and human rights (Furuoka 2014).
China’s rise is seen to be the driver behind these developments (Jain 2014). One of the
main vehicles for its provision of ODA in Africa has been TICAD and this serves as a
microcosm of changes in Japan’s aid policy and guidelines more generally. Abe hosted
the ﬁfth TICAD over the weekend of June 1–2, 2013, celebrating the 20th anniversary of
the process. As has been the case at previous TICADs, Japan pledged to support African
growth over the next ﬁve years through public and private funds totalling ¥3.2 trillion,
including ODA contributions of around ¥1.4 trillion and other public and private
resources of around ¥1.6 trillion. Japan also promised to underwrite a maximum of
¥200 billion in trade insurance. The focus was placed on infrastructure, human resource
training, education and peace-building. Ultimately Japan was extending the kind of
support it extended to Asia in the past, motivated by resource diplomacy but also with
the potential to also lead to rivalry with China on the African continent. As was the case
in 2008 when the Japanese sought to create synergy between the Yokohama Declaration
of TICAD-IV and the G8 summit in Toyako (Dobson 2012b), Abe came to the G8 the
following month in Lough Erne and sought to trumpet the TICAD process and high-
light Japan’s contributions.
Fast-forwarding to the 2015 G7 summit at Schloss Elmau, once again Abe came to
Germany with a number of strategic objectives that reﬂected his desire to break from
the post-war regime that has constrained Japan’s proactive contribution to peace. As
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regards managing the rise of China, on the one hand, Abe was keen to have a
statement included in the summit declaration related to maritime security and,
although not a claimant in the dispute, ideally condemning China’s land reclamation
and construction of artiﬁcial islands in the South China Sea as well as highlighting
the implications for territorial disputes in the East China Sea (to which Japan is a
claimant). In relation to the issue of maritime security and the South and East China
Seas, Abe employed the strategy of likening China’s grab for territory in this region
to Russia’s in Ukraine in order to elicit the support of his fellow G7 leaders. He
repeatedly stressed the importance of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and con-
demned the unilateral use of force by the strong against the weak. Whilst having
to be careful not to alienate Putin and jeopardise the positive upturn in Japanese-
Russian relations since Abe took oﬃce, it paid dividends as the ﬁnal declaration
expressed concerns (without explicitly mentioning China) over “tensions in the East
and South China Seas…[and strongly opposed] the use of intimidation, coercion or
force, as well as any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo, such as
large scale land reclamation” (G7 2015).
Abe also took the opportunity aﬀorded by his post-summit press conference to
emphasise that the legislation his administration had introduced to enable Japan to
exercise its right of collective self-defence was in line with accepted interpretations of
the Japanese constitution, despite opposition within Japan. He also stressed the safe-
guards and conditions in place to ensure Japan would only exercise the right of
collective self-defence appropriately.
In his post-summit press conferences, Abe has repeatedly recognised the purpose
and value of GX summitry – the “frank and spirited exchange of ideas” – and
highlighted a number of objectives more focused on defence and security aims
including North Korea and territorial disputes with China (Kantei 2013d). Abe’s
participation in the G7/8 summits, as well as other mechanisms such as the WEF
and UN, brings both sides of his personality and policy platform (the pragmatic and
the nationalistic) into relief and reﬂects the wider picture of his evolving foreign
policy that seeks to play a more proactive role and address post-war constraints.
Ultimately, it is a case of the Abe administration pursuing more clearly deﬁned goals
based on immediate national interests as deﬁned in the Abe Doctrine in these fora of
global governance.
This trend extended to Japan’s position towards human rights when on May 22,
2013, between the G8 foreign ministers’ meeting and the leaders’ summit, Ueda
Hideaki, Japan’s Human Rights Envoy to the UN, publicly told members of the
committee on the use of torture to “shut up.” This breach of protocol was provoked
by derisory laughter in reaction to his claim that Japan was an advanced nation in
terms of human rights as part of his defence of Japan’s criminal justice system. The
whole event, which was captured and posted on YouTube, reﬂected the interna-
tional community’s concerns towards the Abe administration regarding its attempts
to revise elements of the constitution related to human rights. It also resulted in
diplomatic eﬀorts on the part of Japan to downplay any criticism ahead of
that year’s G8 summit. For example, Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio declared at
a press conference on June 14 that Japan was continuing its diplomatic eﬀorts to
make the twenty-ﬁrst century free of human rights’ abuses (Hokkaido Shinbun,
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June 15, 2013). This whole controversy obviously had the potential to impact
negatively upon Abe’s “values-oriented diplomacy” and its eﬃcacy as a strategy to
maintain Japan’s great power status amongst a community of like-minded
countries.
Historical revisionism
At ﬁrst blush, historical revisionism, including the interpretation of war memories
surrounding World War II, the comfort women and Yasukuni Shrine might appear
to be wholly unrelated and inappropriate issues to pursue within the architecture of
global governance. However, this element of the Abe Doctrine has emerged as an
explicit goal to be pursued by the Abe administration in a number of the mechanisms
of global governance. At the same time, it has coloured the Abe administration’s
engagement with the agenda items of speciﬁc summits.
On the one hand, in October 2014, amidst speculation that the Abe administration
would seek to revise the Kono Statement on the issue of coercion of the “comfort
women,” it emerged that testimony to this eﬀect published by Asahi Shinbun was, in
fact, fabricated. In response, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide requested that the
UN amend a 1996 Special Rapporteur’s report on the issue of violence against women
as part of a Japanese government campaign to promote “accurate” information sur-
rounding the issue of the “comfort women” (Asahi Shinbun, October 14, 2014; The
Japan Times, October 16, 2014). The request was refused by the author of the report,
Radhika Coomaraswamy, with the explanation that as the report was only partially
based on the erroneous evidence the conclusions and recommendations still stood,
which included referring to the “comfort women” as sexual slaves, and requested that
the Japanese government apologise and provide compensation – issues that the Abe
administration considers to be concluded.
Within other UN bodies, the Abe administration has sought to defend robustly its
understanding of history. In October 2015, the United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc
and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) responded positively to a Chinese application to
include disputed documents related to the Nanjing Massacre in its “Memory of the
World Register” citing the need in response to Japanese attempts to whitewash the
issue. The Abe administration’s response, as articulated by Suga, was not only to resist
China’s application and question the approval process but also to consider suspension
of its contributions to UNESCO’s budget (The Japan Times, October 13, 2015). Thus,
the Abe administration appeared to behave in similar fashion to the US in the 1980s
when it sought to use the Kassebaum Amendment and the withholding of funds to the
UN to leverage reform in voting procedures. The Abe administration’s behaviour also
stood in contrast to Japan’s traditional good citizenship in UNESCO, demonstrated by
its status as the largest contributor to its budget in the absence of the US, as well as
remaining in the organisation in the 1980s when the US withdrew in protest at
UNESCO’s policies and lack of reform, promptly followed by some of its closest allies
(Hook et al. 2012, 369).
On the other hand, even when historical revisionism is not being actively pursued,
interpreting issues of global governance placed on the summit agenda by fellow
summiteers through its lens has also been evident. As chair in 2013, the UK
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government was eager to use the G8 to promote the Preventing Sexual Violence
Initiative and to this end the G8 foreign ministers met from 10 to 11 April in
London prior to the Lough Erne Summit of June 2013. Discussions resulted in a
declaration that outlined a number of preventive measures, ongoing monitoring and
new funding totaling US$35.5 million (GOV.UK 2013a). The G8 leaders, including Abe,
later endorsed this declaration at Lough Erne and acknowledged that “…rape and
serious sexual violence in international armed conﬂict constitute grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions” (GOV.UK 2013b). Abe continued with this theme when he
addressed the 68th session of the UNGA in September 2013 and spoke on the topic of
women in conﬂict. He focused on Japan’s eﬀorts to develop a national action plan
regarding women, peace and security, its work to prevent crimes against women whilst
materially and psychologically supporting victims, and intention to submit a draft
resolution at the UN Commission on the Status of Women, giving consideration to
the vulnerability of women in natural disasters (Kantei 2013c). Abe struck a similar
tone when he addressed the 69th and 70th sessions of the UNGA, claiming that “Japan
will stand at the fore and lead the international community in eliminating sexual
violence during conﬂicts,” emphasising Japan’s history of “upholding women’s rights,”
and his own calls “to make the 21st century an era in which women’s human rights are
not infringed upon” (MOFA 2014b, 2015). So, in this way Japan responded positively to
the inclusion of this non-traditional security issue on the agenda of global governance
in keeping with its traditional internationalism.
However, Kishida sought to shape the remit of G8 discussions by emphasising that
the Japanese government was supportive only from the viewpoint of the human rights
of women and that any initiatives should be future-oriented so as to distract attention
from and avoid any references to historical cases of sexual violence against women,
namely the “comfort women” (Asahi Shinbun, June 13, 2013; Shugiin 2013).
So, even the historical revisionism at the heart of the Abe Doctrine has either been
openly in evidence in the Abe administration’s actions within the UN’s associated
bodies or lurking in the background to the international community’s eﬀorts to address
the role of women in conﬂict.
An economically strong Japan
This ﬁnal tenet is to be achieved through the three pillars of Abenomics, as outlined
above, and Abe has actively used the mechanisms of global governance to explain,
promote and gain endorsement of these policies. For example, “to obtain the under-
standing and support of the other G8 leaders regarding my economic policies” was
Abe’s explicit goal at the 2013 Lough Erne Summit (Kantei 2013d). The unpredictable
and negative eﬀects of quantitative easing and the weakening of the yen on the global
economy were reported to have caused concerns amongst some G8 leaders. So, Abe’s
strategy at Lough Erne was to look to the international as well as the domestic, in other
words pre-empt open criticism of Japan at the summit by pitching Abenomics and
claiming endorsement so that the policy could be presented at home as an international
commitment in order to secure leverage. Abe was successful in so far as he was
presented with the opportunity at the summit to explain Abenomics and thereafter
claimed G8 endorsement – “high acclaim” even – in a post-summit press conference
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(Kantei 2013d). However, there is a diﬀerence between endorsement and not hearing
opposition and Abe was pushed in the summit’s ﬁnal communiqué “to address the
challenge of a credible medium-term ﬁscal plan” (GOV.UK 2013b).
A few months later on September 26, 2013, Abe addressed the UNGA in ebullient
mood by stressing his “ﬁrm conviction that the future course of Japan’s diplomacy will
begin here, by sparing no pains to get actively engaged in historic challenges facing
today’s world, with our regained strength and capacity.” To this end, he once again took
the opportunity to promote Abenomics, declaring that “…my obligation ﬁrst of all is to
rebuild the Japanese economy to be vibrant, and then to make Japan a dependable
‘force’ that works for good in the world” (Kantei 2013c). Building on this, and addres-
sing the third arrow of his economic plan, he also declared his belief in the idea of
“womenomics” that would promote the position of women in society and as a result the
growth rate. The following month, Abe used the Indonesian-hosted APEC meeting to
again ﬂy the ﬂag for Abenomics by stressing its results and justify his decision to
increase the consumption tax from 5% to 8% (Kantei 2013e).
At the WEF gathering in January 2014, Abe took the opportunity of this gathering of
world leaders, opinion makers and academics to deliver a speech entitled “A New
Vision from a New Japan.” In this speech, rather than outline anything approaching a
“new vision,” Abe ﬁrst and foremost took the opportunity to tread the now well-worn
territory of previous speeches by outlining the policies that constitute Abenomics and
make claims for his own success. Abe likened himself to “a drill bit; strong enough to
break through the solid rock of vested investments…Over the next two years, no vested
interests will remain immune from my drill” (Kantei 2014). In order to lay claim to the
success of Abenomics and dispel speculation surrounding Japan’s decline, he stated
that:
Pundits used to say that Japan was at dusk, or the land of the setting sun. They said that for
a country as mature as Japan, growth would be impossible. These arguments were made to
sound almost legitimate. You can see what Japan’s psyche was like before I took oﬃce as
Prime Minister. Hardly can you hear such voices now. Our growth rate has changed
dramatically, from negative growth to positive…It is not twilight, but a new dawn that is
breaking over Japan (Kantei 2014).
So, the WEF appeared to be a re-run of Lough Erne, where Abe employed the same
strategy of using an international forum to get approval for his policies with one eye on
the domestic audience and securing support back home.
Thereafter, Abe attended the seventh G20 summit in Brisbane from 15 to
16 November 2014 just days before he decided to dissolve the Lower House and call
a snap election. Possibly with this in mind, Abe once again used the summit as an
opportunity to seek the endorsement of the international community for Abenomics
and, despite disappointing growth ﬁgures, this support was forthcoming (The Japan
Times, November 16, 2014). In addition, a section in the G7 Schloss Elmau declaration
was dedicated to women’s economic empowerment, reﬂecting the third pillar of
Abenomics that stresses structural reform (G7 2015). However, serious questions
remain concerning Abe’s sincerity and concrete results in the promotion of the position
of women (Kano and Mackie 2013). Finally, although dominated by the Paris terror
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attacks, Abe still used the opportunity of the G20 summit in Antalya, Turkey to
continue his advocacy of Abenomics.
What emerges is a concerted eﬀort to promote and secure endorsement for
Abenomics through the mechanisms of global governance. Admittedly this is not
speciﬁc to the Abe administration. For example, this was the same approach adopted
by Abe’s predecessor Noda Yoshihiko at the 2011 G20 Cannes Summit as regards the
consumption tax. However, it is a key element of the Abe Doctrine that should not be
overlooked and is in fact essential to the realisation of the other tenets.
Impact and Implications
As Glosserman (2014, 39) argues, “…Abe Shinzo’s goal is simple: end all doubts about his
country’s status as a ﬁrst-class nation.” Across a range of activities explored elsewhere in
the literature, “the Abe administration has focused on creating the conditions which would
allow Japan to more forcefully assert and defend its national interest.” In essence, this
objective and conditions constitute the Abe Doctrine and, as demonstrated above, we can
now add the architecture of global governance to the range of activities in which the Abe
administration has sought to create these conditions in its pursuit of the doctrine.
This stands in stark contrast to Japan’s traditional behaviour across a range of
institutions of global governance that has demonstrated a strong sense of internation-
alism and a corresponding commitment to Asianism. Soeya (2012) discusses middle-
power diplomacy as embracing behaviour, status and strategy and in the case of Japan,
its “diplomatic behaviour has essentially reﬂected ‘middle-power internationalism,’
while its status has been uncertain and its strategy confused or non-existent.” This
neatly captures its role in the mechanisms of global governance during the post-war
period and over recent years. Between 2008 and 2012, when the traditional institutions
of global governance were seen to decline in inﬂuence and a “messy multilateralism”
emerged with the creation of new mechanisms, Japan’s reaction was to cling to these
normative impulses that had deﬁned its role but under the pressures of a tectonic shift
in the global order the result appeared at times to be qualiﬁed, contradictory and
lacking imagination.
Under Abe, however, Soeya’s characterisation has been reversed so that Japan’s
status is now being clearly articulated and its strategy more coherent, while the “mid-
dle-power internationalism” in diplomatic behaviour has been confused or even non-
existent. The Abe administration has explicitly and repeatedly used the mechanisms of
global governance not for the promotion of global public goods but more as a means to
promote the tenets of the Abe Doctrine: secure Japan’s great power status, promote a
more proactive and robust Japanese security role, engage in historical revisionism to
challenge post-war taboos and constraints, and promote Abenomics as the solution to
rebuilding an economically strong Japan.
Yet, as Hughes argues, pursuing the Abe Doctrine appears a high-risk approach as
the weight of its internal contradictions threaten to jeopardise the very objectives it
seeks to realise:
… the Doctrine claims the pursuit of universal values, but its underlying revisionism is
illiberal, and thus conﬂictual; the Doctrine seeks to end the post-war regime through
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historical revisionism, but the focus on history creates divisions with the US and East Asia;
and the Doctrine seeks autonomy through dependence on the US that only further
frustrates Japan’s lack of sovereign independence (Hughes 2015, 91).
Glosserman (2014, 50) points to similar tensions:
Indeed, insisting that Japan is a great power, as Abe and others have, only sets Tokyo up
for failure by setting unrealistic and unrealizable standards. Accepting its limits and
recalibrating its ambitions would permit Japan to be assessed according to its own criteria –
what it chooses to be – rather than what it is not.
The Abe administration’s behaviour in the various mechanisms of global governance
presented here suggests similar risks and contradictions, although it should be noted
that the very nature of the more informal and softer mechanisms can serve to obfuscate
these tensions. Traditionally G7 and G8 summits in particular and G20 summitry to an
extent, are fora in which leaders seek to support each other in the process of reaching a
compromise and avoid singling each other out in public for criticism (Sakurada 1988,
102–103; Bayne 2005). In addition, any evaluation of the impact and implications of
this shift from middle-power internationalism to the Abe Doctrine will inevitably be
tentative as we are only three years into the Abe administration. Nevertheless, three
risks are emerging.
First, the Abe administration is pursuing the tenets of the Abe Doctrine regardless of
how appropriate they may or may not be to the work of global governance institutions.
In the case of the fourth tenet, building an economically strong Japan through
Abenomics may sit relatively comfortably within the agendas of global governance.
However, as seen above, the Abe administration’s attention is focused domestically as it
has taken every opportunity to explain, promote and seek international approval with
the ultimate objective of translating this international approval into leverage at home in
the face of domestic opposition. This waxing of hard national interest and the waning
of Japan’s traditional internationalist approach to global governance were reﬂected in a
number of interviews conducted in January 2014 with elite MOFA oﬃcials during
which very little sense emerged of what global governance means generally, to Japan or
to them as individuals. For example, one interviewee referred to global governance as a
mechanism for creating a better future for Japan and stressed the importance of leaders
exerting leadership in achieving this goal, but had little to say beyond this. Another
interviewee highlighted Japan’s case-by-case approach depending on the issue and the
institution in question but admitted he had given it little thought and answered the
question with a question by asking if any country had an understanding of global
governance or its own particular vision. This is a potentially counterproductive devel-
opment. As the recent WikiLeaks scandal revealed in the case of North Korea’s nuclear
and missile programmes, Japan’s allies became increasingly exasperated and critical of it
privileging narrow domestic interests (the abduction issue) rather than issues of regio-
nal and global concern (Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2010). By similarly diluting
its traditional internationalism in favour of pursuing hard national interest in the
mechanisms of global governance, the Abe administration runs the risk of raising
similar doubts within the international community as to its commitment and isolating
itself further in the process.
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Second, the Abe administration’s eﬀorts to use the mechanisms of global govern-
ance to end the liberal post-war regime, symbolised by the constitutional “shackles”
that limit Japan’s role and motivated by illiberal historical revisionism, have the
potential to foster conﬂict within the international community. For example, since
returning to power, concerns of varying degrees have been voiced within the inter-
national community regarding the historical revisionism of Abe himself, his admin-
istration and individual Japanese politicians. This was seen when the US government
used the uncharacteristically strong language of “disappointment” over Abe’s
December 2013 visit to Yasukuni Shrine (Press Release 2013). A month later,
Chinese and Korean ambassadors took the opportunity in a UNSC debate to criticise
their Japanese counterpart over Abe’s visit and its impact on regional relations (BBC
News, January 30, 2014). Japan’s response was that it had faced up to its history and
expressed regret and apology, as well as arguing that it was inappropriate to raise
these issues in a forum like the UNSC – which smacks of hypocrisy considering the
way in which it has imported the Abe Doctrine into the mechanisms of global
governance.
So, we are also presented with the risk of Japan’s neighbours adopting a similar
approach to the mechanisms of global governance resulting in conﬂict rather than
cooperation. As mentioned above, China has used the architecture of global governance
to promote its understanding of history, as demonstrated by the application to the
UNESCO “Memory of the World Register.” South Korean President Park has also used
the UN to engage in history battles with Japan. Addressing the 70th session of the
UNGA in September 2015, she took the opportunity when discussing the issue of sexual
violence against women in conﬂict to refer to the surviving “comfort women,” call for a
resolution and plead that “[t]he eﬀorts of the UN High Commissioners of Human
Rights and Special Rapporteurs on this issue must not be allowed to come to naught.”
In the same speech, Park also mentioned Abe’s security reforms and alluded to the
historical legacy of Japan’s militarism by warning that:
… new moves that could potentially have profound consequences for Northeast Asia’s
security order are leading to misgivings among countries in the region. Japan’s recently
passed defense and security legislation should be implemented transparently and in a way
that is conducive to friendly relations among regional countries and to peace and stability
in the region (Republic of Korea 2015).
Third, the Abe administration’s pursuit of “values-oriented diplomacy” in the mechan-
isms of global governance is clearly in evidence. However, this has little to do with
universal values and is being deployed for narrowly-focused Realist reasons: to build
strategic partnerships that exclude rivals, chieﬂy China, stall necessary reforms to the
architecture of global governance and, in the case of the G7, bolster a favoured but
increasingly outdated mechanism of global governance that preserves Japan’s great
power status in aspic. Articulating values that seek to exclude important regional and
global partners like China and Russia run the risk, as seen in the case of the AIIB, of
ironically isolating Japan in the process. Japan’s fellow G7 summiteers have responded
coolly to Abe’s “values-oriented diplomacy” by signing up to the AIIB and privileging
their own national interests through engagement with China.
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So, Japan’s behaviour in global governance may be more consistent, strategic even, as
a result of pursuing the Abe Doctrine. However, jettisoning any internationalist nor-
mative impulse, vision of global governance, or sense of global leadership in favour of a
narrow focus on national interest runs the risk of unintended, opposite outcomes. In a
diﬀerent context, Cho (2013) has argued that East Asia’s (speciﬁcally China, Japan and
Korea) desire to adopt a global role and make concrete contributions to activities such
as peacekeeping, climate change and nuclear non-proliferation are compromised by
domestic and regional considerations. The exploration of the Abe administration’s
behaviour in the mechanisms of global governance presented here appears to support
the claim.
Concluding Remarks
The BBC drama 37 Days that documented the diplomatic eﬀorts in the run-up to the
outbreak of World War I put the following words into the mouth of Sir Edward Grey,
the British Foreign Minister: “It’s what happens to great powers when they shrink; the
world shrinks with them and then they cease to think about consequences.” In many
ways, this captures the recent evolution and future direction of Japan’s role in global
governance under the Abe administration as it grapples with its decline by focusing on
domestic issues and turns away from its responsibilities as a great power.
This matters because Abe appears to be in a relatively strong position that has not
been enjoyed by Japanese prime ministers for some time and is likely to remain in
power until 2018. In other words, the Abe Doctrine has time to gestate. This also
matters because 2016 represents an important year for Asian leadership and global
governance as Japan hosts the G7 and China hosts the G20 (Chin and Dobson 2015).
Despite the distractions of a US presidential election and UK referendum on Europe,
clear opportunities exist for a coordinated response that puts Asian issues ﬁrmly on the
agenda. However, numerous obstacles remain. The Abe administration’s steady shift
away from Japan’s traditional internationalism towards a more narrowly focused
defence of its great power status, a pro-active security role and historical revisionism
in response to the rise of China stand out as some of the highest hurdles to overcome.
Notes
1. Global governance is a notoriously vague term. One of the ﬁrst and most commonly cited
deﬁnitions was provided by the Commission on Global Governance: “Governance is the
sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common
aﬀairs. It is a continuing process through which conﬂicting or diverse interests may be
accommodated and cooperative action taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes
empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and
institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest” (1995, 4). This is helpful
as it clariﬁes that we are not talking about “global government” and instead places the
emphasis on cooperative action taken through formal institutions, regimes and informal
arrangements. Nevertheless, it has been widely interpreted in the literature on global
governance (Wilkinson 2005). More recently, “global summitry” has been posited as a
term that returns the focus to the arrangements, in addition to the behaviour of actors,
through which meaningful collective action can be fostered: “Global summitry involves the
architecture, institutions and, most critically, the political and policy behavior of the actors
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engaged in the inﬂuence of outcomes of common concern in the international system.
Global summitry includes all actors – international organizations, trans-governmental net-
works, states and non-state entities whether individuals, corporations or associations – that
inﬂuence the agenda, the organization and the execution of global politics and policy”
(Alexandroﬀ and Brean 2015, 2). The focus of this present article is on this architecture of
formal and informal institutions and mechanisms that successfully or unsuccessfully foster
cooperative action in the global order. To this end, it recognizes the utility of the latter
deﬁnition, but for the sake of clarity will adopt the more commonly used term of global
governance.
2. This matters in that the decline of any great power can result not just from a decline in
material power but also a lack of will. For example, in January 2014, despite President
Obama’s lobbying in favour of revised IMF quotas, the US Congress blocked them, resulting
in a schizophrenic response and reputational damage that harked back to the League of
Nations (Frankel 2014).
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